The beauty of fantasy baseball is there’s rarely a right or wrong. There may be better and worse, but any strategy can win with the right players. What works for one may be a detriment for another. The key is finding a plan within your comfort zone, taking advantage of strengths while mitigating weaknesses.
One of the more popular ploys is drafting towards category totals that would have won in previous seasons, often called target drafting. History demonstrates that league champions average about 75 percent of the available rotisserie points. So the idea is to target the stats necessary to finish at the standings place corresponding to 75 percent of the category points. Depending on the size of the leagues, this entails finishing third or fourth across the board.
Many swear by this process. There are numerous sources that provide category targets for various league formats along with advice on how to attain the goals. But think about this. How many target drafters met or exceeded their objectives? Chances are, everyone. Now how many won the league? A strategy is as much about comfort and confidence as it is about tactics and game theory. But a strong argument can be made that it was superior evaluation and tactical execution that resulted in victory and not meeting targets on draft day.
Research shows that league champions draft between 65 and 90 percent of their total production. The rest is acquired through in-season management. In other words, while you may have drafted X number of home runs, on the average, players you drafted only account for 75 percent of that. This is the primary reason target drafting isn’t as effective as it seems on paper. You didn’t draft X homers. Who knows how many more you may have drafted if you weren’t so focused on meeting the target and funneling assets elsewhere?
Another gigantic pitfall with target drafting is not accounting for planned use of reserves. Target drafting assumes each player will be the only one active in that roster spot all season. This is obviously not true, especially with respect to pitching. Most leagues afford some level of leveraging matchups, which does not get captured via target drafting.
The above discusses planned use of reserves. What about injuries? About one-third of all Major League players visit the disabled list nowadays. These are players you drafted. Some of these injuries may have been accounted for in your original projection (though the extra stats received from the replacement are absent). Others get hurt unexpectedly so they fail to meet original expectations, contributing to the aforementioned 65-90 percent. How you replace the injured players is what determines if you’ll win the league, not how many stats you theoretically drafted.
Let’s take a step back and think things through from a practical perspective. You’re drafting towards a target and I’m not. We’re in separate drafts but the picks previous to our turns were identical. We both choose the same player. You scratch out the original targets and scribble down the adjusted ones. This occurs round after round. You get closer and closer to your targets. We’re both doing the exact same thing; selecting the players we feel will help our teams the most. You’re doing the additional step of adjusting targets while I’m probably eating a snack. There’s no difference to our team construct.
However, at some point, our focuses will shift. You’re trying to win the draft while I’m trying to win the league. Your concentration is continuing to draft static projected stats so you can continue to scratch out and scribble down until the scribble reaches zero. I’m looking at the upside potential and downside risk of each player. The static projection means nothing to me. What happens if this player picks up more playing time because a teammate got hurt? What are the chances the skills growth that a player displayed the second half of last season are real? What if this pitcher’s new pitch increases his strikeout potential? What if that minor leaguer gets off to a hot start in Triple-A and is promoted earlier than expected? What are the chances this set-up man usurps the closer position?
You’re drafting Erick Aybar so you can attain your steals target. I’m drafting Jose Peraza in the 
event he wins the second base job and swipes forty bags. You’re drafting Trevor Plouffe to get closer to your home run target. I’m taking Jake Lamb figuring there’s no way Yasmany Tomas sticks at third base and Lamb with get the job. You’re taking Addison Reed to meet your saves objective. I’m taking Ken Giles and his off-the-chart peripherals and hoping Jonathan Papelbon is traded. You’re trying to win the draft. I’m trying to win the league.
More so than anything, this is the real downfall of target drafting: the focus on a static projection and not weighing the upside potential versus downside risk. While they are generally presented as static numbers, projections should really be considered a range of plausible outcomes. Target drafting doesn’t capture that. Target drafting is especially dangerous with leagues that allow trading. Once you reach your goal, you may shift attention to another category. Often, this results in leaving a better player on the board, but one whose contributions aren’t needed to meet the target. You’re reducing the long-term potential of your roster, since dealing from excess can balance things out.
There is one time where tracking categories can be advantageous. In no-trading leagues, categorical excess is wasted. As such, a balance is needed with respect to home runs and stolen bases. You don’t need to actually draft towards a target, but having an idea of the ratio of homers to steals can help make sure you’re not left with a surplus in one and a deficiency in the other that can’t be addressed via in-season management.
If drafting towards a target affords a level of comfort, that’s fine. Just remember the goal is to win the league, not the draft.